Moscow's latest military campaign against Chechnya has not only killed hundreds, wounded thousands and driven almost a quarter of a million people from their homes: it has created a humanitarian and political crisis beyond the capacity of the Russian government to cope. Moreover, the Russian authorities' continuing police actions and media attacks against ethnic Chechens and other North Caucasians now living in the Russian Federation not only has led to the physical expulsion of many of these people from Russian cities: it has also broken the taboo against government-sponsored attacks on individuals because of their ethnic ties, thus opening the door to attacks against other minority groups in that country.Neither the Russian military campaign against Chechnya nor police actions against Chechens as a group, however, has broken the will of the Chechen people or lessened their resolve to live in an independent Chechnya. If anything, the current Russian assaults against civilians in Chechnya itself and the portrayal of the Chechen nation as a whole as a uniquely criminal or terrorist community has only redoubled the resolve of the Chechens. And consequently, the Chechens are certain to continue their now centuries' old struggle for freedom --whatever victories Moscow and its supporters may report or claim.But this prospect of continuing Chechen resistance is hardly the only feature of the future that Moscow's policies have made more likely. The Russian government's recent actions against Chechnya and the Chechens have simultaneously undermined the likelihood that Russia will move in a democratic direction, threatened the prospects for stability between Russia and her neighbors, and reduced the chances for the development of the kind of cooperative relationship between Russia and the West that so many people on both sides had hoped for. This spreading collateral damage is my subject here.
Undermining Democracy
Moscow's actions against Chechnya and the Chechens have seriously reduced the chances that the Russian Federation will continue to move in a democratic direction. Indeed, as several observers have put it, Russia's advance on Grozny has been accompanied by Russia's retreat from democracy. There are at least three reasons for this unpleasant conclusion.First of all, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's decision to use military force rather than political means to deal with Chechnya and the Chechens and even more the popularity he has won domestically by doing so combine to make it more likely rather than less that he or his successors will continue to employ this tactic. By its very nature, such use of force and even more its popularity will make it more difficult for Russia to move toward democracy and its precondition, the rule of law.If the Russian authorities had used police power to track down those individuals they suspected of engaging in terrorist actions, no one would have objected. And if Moscow had argued that it wanted to reassert control over Chechnya as a territory, many in the West might have said that was a reasonable if not especially attractive step for the central government there to take. But Moscow's use of force was not only disproportionate to either of these goals but involved the demonization of the Chechens and other minorities in ways that will make it far more difficult for the Russian authorities to establish a legitimate and democratic form of rule over much of their country.This demonization of a particular ethnic community and again the enormous popularity of it among many Russians to judge from the polls together form the second threat to democracy. Although the Chechens number only a million and are thus a tiny fraction of Russia's population, the percentage of Russian Federation citizens who are Muslims or who are at least not ethnically Russian is large and growing. Demonizing one of these groups with the apparent backing of the dominant natinality raises the possibility that others will be demonized, a prospect that has already offended some non-Russians and may offend still more. To give but one example, the government of the predominantly Turkic and Muslim Republic of Tatarstan has denounced what Moscow is doing in Chechnya and ordered that no Tatars should serve in the Russian army there.But it is the destruction of the taboo against demonizing and attacking an ethnic community as a whole that is the most serious aspect of this challenge to the future of democratic governance in Russia. In the past, Russian governments have exploited popular xenophobic sentiments to win support for themselves by blaming so-called "outsiders" for their problems. The anti-Chechen campaign, and especially the Putin government's open support of the actions of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and other regional leaders interested in expelling "persons of Caucasian nationality," raise the spectre that some Russian leader of political group might seek power by turning to the same base prejudices. That is all the more likely because there is some evidence that many of those in Russia now attacking the Chechens and other North Caucasians are prepared to attack Jews -- as in Krasnodar -- or Kurds -- as in Nizhny Novgorod.And third, under the cover of the bombing of Grozny and the attacks on Chechens in Russian cities, the Russian government has moved to reinstitute the kind of controls over the media that are reminiscent of the late Soviet period and thus avoid the anti-regime sentiments generated by Russian media coverage of Moscow's last intervention in Chechnya in 1994-96. Earlier this year, Moscow established a new ministry to manage the media, and its leader has sought to keep the press from playing what he calls "an aggressive role" against the interests of the state. The Russian army has instituted extremely tight battlefield censorship and restricted the access of reporters to Chechnya. And the Russian authorities have struck out at Chechen-related Internet sites, threatened journalists who want to get the truth out, and otherwise sought to restrict the flow of information.This has offended some Russians. As one of the leaders of the Russian Soldiers' Mothers Committee put it this week, "all official statements about Chechnya are lies." But unfortunately, not all Russians have the access to the kind of information which allows them to make that judgment. Indeed, such actions by the Russian government have exacerbated the collapse of the Russian regional media, thus making Moscow's official voice often the only one many people here.I am proud that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has had reporters on the ground to cover what is going one in the North Caucasus and elsewhere and to give the Russian people a more accurate picture than their press and electronic media now are supplying. It is a measure of the times and something I believe we can take pride in that Russian media outlets are now attacking RFE/RL and its Russian language service in ways that also recall the late Soviet period.Fortunately, many Russians are increasingly aware of this danger as well and beginning to protest what their government is doing. But as of now, they are still few in number and isolated one from another. As a result, the Putin government clearly believes that it can not only get away with the management of the news but that it will be the primary beneficiary of doing so. None of this bodes well for the future of democracy in Russia.
Threatening Regional Stability
The impact of Russia's campaigns against Chechnya and the Chechens are not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, whatever the Russian government may claim. Because Moscow is now in violation of the internationally agreed to CFE limitations, the Russian authorities have put enormous pressure on Georgia and its neighbors to yield some of their equipment quotas to Moscow so that the Russians will not be held accountable for breaking the limits. To date, Tbilisi and the others have been unwilling to do so. But as Moscow has demonstrated in the past, it has a variety of means -- economic, political, military and others as well -- at its disposal to pressure the leaders of the neighboring countries.Moreover, Russia's neighbors cannot help but be nervous that Moscow's latest turn to the use of violence presages a greater willingness to employ force implicitly or even directly against them. Most of the post-Soviet states in the CIS have Russian military forces on their territories. Most of these regimes are relatively weak and do not yet have the domestic stability or outside support to resist successfully any Russian pressure of this kind. And most have seen dramatic events in at least a few of these countries that leaders like President Eduard Shevardnadze have laid at the feet of Russian special forces. At a time when such forces appear to be on the march within Russia, their concerns about the use of these agencies abroad will only grow.Even if these perceptions are incorrect in whole or in part, their existence will have the effect of raising the level of tensions among these countries, thereby making political resolution of differences more difficult and increasing the temptation of the stronger party to employ threats to get its way.Such feelings are likely to become especially strong in those countries which are either Turkic or Muslim and who may see Russian policy about the Chechens as ultimately applying to them. (At the same time, Moscow's approach may give aid and comfort to more extremist groups within the ethnic Russian communities within these countries out of an expectation that they might enlist Moscow to support them against the local governments.) That will make at least some of these states think about distancing themselves from Moscow still further, possibly leading to a new crisis if the Russian authorities try to prevent that from happening. While Russia's neighbors have been cautious in public about what Moscow is doing lest they further anger Moscow, most are quite concerned about the spread in one form or another of Putin's current approach.
Undercutting US-Russian Cooperation
This Russian retreat from democracy and the likelihood of greater instability in the post-Soviet region obviously has an impact on the United States and its interest in developing a more cooperative relationship with the Russian Federation.Because hopes for such a new relationship were so high, many counselled against criticizing Moscow either for its attacks on Chechnya in 1994-96 or for the October 1993 introduction by Mayor Luzhkov of his Chechen expulsion policy. During the first Chechen war -- if I may use the periodization Yelena Bonner has employed here -- most Western leaders were either silent or even supportive, in the hopes that President Boris Yeltsin would soon turn again toward democracy.But the events of the last two months suggest that hope was misplaced, and indeed some have suggested that the reason Moscow has acted in the way that it has against Chechnya and the Chechens is precisely because the West appeared to be so willing not to object. It is difficult to know for sure that that is a correct analysis, but the absence of vigorous criticism last time certainly encouraged some in Moscow to think that they could do something like this again and at no cost.Consequently, we can only welcome the much tougher statements that have emanated recently from Washington, from the European Union, from the United Nations, from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and from particular governments and human rights organizations. Putting ourselves on record against evil is always the right thing to do; putting ourselves on record against an evil that will ultimately threaten our own society and its interests is an imperative.Unfortunately, Putin and other Russian leaders have made it clear that they think they can safely ignore and may even benefit at home and abroad from being seen to ignore such Western criticism. That unfortunate attitude raises the stakes. Western governments in general and the United States in particular naturally and justifiably have been reluctant to impose real penalties by restricting aid, loans and other assistance to the Russian Federation lest any cutback lead Moscow to turn away from reforms in other areas.But Moscow's actions and especially its recent reactions to Western and American criticism suggest that the US and other Western governments will have to revisit this issue soon , possibly reducing or at least making contingent any future assistance. Failure to do that will not only further lower our moral influence in Russia and other countries but it could encourage Moscow to behave even worse in the future. Should that happen, those who now argue against any such penalties would eventually face -- along with the rest of us -- a Russia with which most Western countries would find it difficult to cooperate at all.